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Empirical evidence is presented which suggests that trust is more important in facilitating 
exchange in transitional economies than industrial economies. Furthermore, the various item 
measures that have been employed to evaluate trust in Europe, North America, Australia and 
Japan, fail to accurately describe the construct among small farmers in a developing country.  
While further studies are necessary to develop a more robust measure of trust, in the context 




Trust is the critical determinant of a good relationship (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Ganesan 
1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994). For any exchange, trust will be critical if two situational 
factors are present; risk and incomplete buyer information. In such situations, trust acts as an 
information resource that directly reduces the perceived threat of information asymmetry and 
performance ambiguity (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000). Trust enables buyers to adopt 
schemas which leave them free to act where they are unable to acquire sufficient information 
(Selnes 1998) or where the buyer must process more information than they are capable of 
handling (Tomkins 2001). 
 
Anderson and Narus (1990) view trust as the belief that the partner will perform actions that 
will result in positive outcomes for the firm and not to take unexpected actions that may result 
in negative outcomes. Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) define trust as the 
willingness to rely upon an exchange partner in whom one has confidence. They describe trust 
as a belief, a sentiment or an expectation about an exchange partner that results from the 
partner’s expertise, reliability and intentionality. This component of trust, which Ganesan 
(1994) describes as credibility, is based on the extent to which the focal firm believes that its 
partner has the required expertise to perform the activities effectively and reliably.  
 
However, trust also relates to the focal firm’s intention to rely on their exchange partner. 
Ganesan (1994) describes this component as benevolence, because it is based on the extent to 
which the focal firm believes that its partner has intentions and motives beneficial to it. A 
benevolent partner will subordinate immediate self-interest for the long-term benefit of both 
parties and will not take actions that may have a negative impact on the focal firm (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp and Kumar 1998).  
 
Heide (1994) considers inter-organisational trust to be a governance mechanism that mitigates 
opportunism in exchange transactions. When trust exists, the focal firm believes that long-
term idiosyncratic investments can be made with limited risk because their partner will refrain 
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from using their power to renege on contracts or to use a change in circumstances to obtain 
profits in their own favour (Ganesan 1994). Trust increases the partner’s tolerance for each 
other’s behaviour, facilitating the informal resolution of conflict, which allows the partners to 
better adapt to the needs and capabilities of the other (Hakansson and Sharma 1996). 
 
However, Anderson and Narus (1990) and Doney and Cannon (1997) find it necessary to 
differentiate between organisational trust and trust in an individual. Swan, Trawick and Silva 
(1985) indicate how competence, customer orientation, honesty, dependability and likeability 
facilitate the development of trust between sales representatives and their customers. 
Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) argue that the interpersonal factors that most affect 
personal trust include perceived expertise, sincerity, integrity, tactfulness, timeliness and 
confidentiality.  
 
Furthermore, trust may vary not only between individuals and organisations, but also between 
nationalities (Conway and Swift 2000). While it is much easier to trust someone if one can 
relate to them, differences in culture, accepted business practice, the economic environment, 
legal system and communications infrastructure, will make developing trust in international 
markets a more challenging task (Skarmeas and Katsikeas 2001), especially in the developing 
world where there is imperfect information and the lack of any effective legal mechanism for 
handling disputes (Lyon 2000). Here trust relies to a much greater extent on reputations, 
sanctions and moral norms, where the most commonly reported reason for trusting someone is 
the result of a long-standing relationship and personal friendship. Putnam (1993) suggests that 
trust is based primarily in the social system, where individual’s find themselves capable of 
trusting because of the social norms and networks within which their actions are embedded. 
Sako (1992) similarly describes how when trust is present, transactions may take place 
without prior agreement on all terms and conditions because of embedded social relationships.   
 
Parkhe (1993) reveals how building trust in a relationship requires a deliberate strategy of 
forbearance with a view towards future pay-offs and accumulated evidence of non-reneging 
behaviour. With trust, there is an increasing willingness to put oneself at risk, be it through 
intimate disclosure, reliance on another’s promises or sacrificing present rewards for future 
gains. However, the extent to which trust develops in a relationship will depend upon how the 
respective parties feel and behave and the value of the outcomes achieved. When economic 
outcomes are high, the focal firm may attribute a great deal of credit to their partner and thus 
the focal firm’s attraction to and trust in their partner will increase (Geyskens, Steenkamp and 
Kumar 1998). Conversely, when economic outcomes are low, the focal firm may become 
frustrated and attribute blame to the partner, thereby leading to reduced trust (Frazier 1983).  
 
Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) suggest that trust operates at two levels; in the ordering of the 
relationships required for basic market transactions (minimal trust), and in the relationships 
which sustain the cooperation seen in industrial supply chains and clusters (extended trust). 
Particularly in the developing world, where institutional mechanisms for redress are lacking 
and actively engaging in opportunistic behaviour is often rewarded, the benefits of extended 
trust become obvious when unanticipated contingencies are dealt with through cooperation. 
The incentive to cooperate is greatest when the firm’s face challenges they cannot easily 
address on their own. 
 
In building trust in relationships, Sako (1992) finds it necessary to differentiate between trust 
at three distinct levels. Competence trust is derived from the assumption that the entrusted 
firm will carry out its activities competently and reliably. Contractual trust is an expectation 
that the partner will abide by its written or oral contractual obligations and act according to 
generally accepted business practice. Goodwill trust arises where both parties have developed 
mutual expectations that the other will do more than it is formally committed to perform. Here 
the firm not only expects the other not to act opportunistically, but that it will, altruistically, 
go out of its way to help (McCutcheon and Stuart 2000). While history, cumulative 
interaction and transference may build the lower forms of trust, the development of goodwill 
trust will require not only the absence of exploitation and coercion, but also a history of 
demonstrated good intentions.  
 
While a great deal has been written about the development and maintenance of trust in buyer-
seller relationships in Europe, North America, Australia and Japan, very little research has 
been conducted in the developing world. Although Sako (1992), Humphrey and Schmitz 
(1998), Moore (1999) and Lyon (2000) offer similar definitions of trust, there is no empirical 
evidence to support the universality of the construct. Using six item measures developed by 
Doney and Cannon (1997), this paper seeks to explore the extent to which trust is consistent 




Data for the two South East Asian studies were collected from detailed personal interviews 
with potato farmers in the highlands of The Philippines (Batt 2000) and East Java (Aji 2001) 
where both studies sought to examine the nature of the buyer-seller relationship between 
potato growers and their seed suppliers. Data for the two Western Australian studies were 
taken from the results of mail questionnaires sent to all fresh fruit and vegetable growers in 
WA which sought to examine the nature of the growers’ relationship with their preferred 
market agent (Batt 2001) and to all grape growers in WA which sought to examine the nature 
of the growers’ relationship with their preferred winery (Batt and Wilson 2000).  
 
In three of the four studies, the growers responses were evaluated using a seven point from 1 
(I disagree a lot) to 7 (I agree a lot). However, since one study used a six point scale, in order 
to compare the means, it was first necessary to adjust the mean scores before using ANOVA 
to determine if there was any significant difference among the means. 
  
Each data set was then analysed using principal component analysis (with varimax rotation 
and Kaiser normalisation). Those items with factor loadings below 0.5 or with cross-loadings 
greater than 0.4 were excluded (Nunnally 1978). Further clarification of the contribution each 
item made to the factor was achieved by applying the reliability coefficient (Cronbach 1951). 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Significant differences for each of the item scores were found between the respective studies 
(Table 1). The levels of trust between potato growers and seed suppliers in The Philippines    
(TP) and grape growers and the wineries in WA (GG), was significantly higher than that 
demonstrated by potato growers and seed suppliers in East Java (EJ) and fresh fruit and 
vegetable growers and their market agents in WA (FVG). Potato growers in The Philippines 
demonstrated a much higher belief in the information provided by their seed supplier than the 
other three grower groups. Similarly, potato growers and grape growers had significantly 
higher levels of confidence in their preferred partner than the fresh fruit and vegetable 
growers had in their preferred market agent. 
 
In looking at the difference between potato growers in South East Asia and the two grower 
groups in WA, it was apparent that potato farmers in The Philippines and East Java believed 
that their most preferred seed supplier was both more likely to keep their promise and to act in 
a manner that was in the growers’ best interest. 
 
 Table 1. Adjusted means for the Six Trust Item Measures. 
 
Item measures SE Asia WA 
TP EJ GG FVG 
Sample size 234 209 26 181 
     
Trust preferred partner 6.15a 4.78b 5.47a 4.79b 
Believe information provided by preferred partner 5.74a 4.73b 5.16b 4.78b 
Have confidence in preferred partner 5.98a 5.75a 5.56ab 5.03b 
Partner always considers my best interests 5.41b 6.07a 4.17c 4.38c 
Partner is not always honest with me 2.24b 1.86b 3.32a 3.12a 
Partner always keeps promises 5.59a 6.07a 4.89b 4.55b 
 
  where those items with the same superscript are not significantly different at p = 0.05 
    
This result was not unexpected. As the majority of potato growers in both The Philippines and 
East Java are very small farmers, most are capital constrained and therefore dependent upon 
their seed suppliers to provide the finance required to cultivate the crop. Seed suppliers 
advance funds to growers with the express intention of securing the crop at harvest, whereby, 
after deducting their costs (including interest), they return the residual balance to the growers. 
Since there are few opportunities for legal recourse, a high degree of trust between the grower 
and the seed supplier is required. Even although the growers are highly vulnerable to potential 
exploitation, various social norms and sanctions constrain opportunism. 
 
Significant differences were also found from the results of principal component analysis. For 
the two studies conducted in WA, a robust unidimensional construct was achieved in both 
cases. For the grape growers (GG), the reliability coefficient was 0.916 and for the fruit and 
vegetable growers (FVG), the reliability coefficient was 0.910 (Table 2). From their research 
in North America, Doney and Cannon (1997) found trust to be a unidimensional construct. 
Employing 8 item measures, the reliability coefficient for their construct was 0.94. 
  
Table 2. Factor scores for the two Western Australian studies. 
 
 GG FVG 
Trust preferred partner 0.909 0.887 
Have confidence in preferred partner 0.906 0.891 
Partner always considers my best interests 0.746 0.863 
Partner is not always honest with me   
Partner always keeps promises 0.951 0.858 
Believe information provided by preferred partner 0.871 0.748 
   
Eigenvalue  4.058 4.044 
Percent variance 67.64 67.40 
Cronbach's alpha 0.916 0.910 
However, for the Philippines and Indonesia, these same 6 item measures produced two, two 
factor solutions. For the Philippines, the first factor captured the seed supplier’s credibility. 
With a reliability coefficient of 0.78, this factor was considered sufficiently robust. However, 
with a reliability coefficient of just 0.49, the second factor could not be accepted (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Factor scores for the two South East Asian studies. 
 
 Philippines East Java 
 1 2 1 2 
Trust preferred partner  .769 .874  
Have confidence in preferred partner .720   .780 
Partner always considers my best interests  .645  .872 
Partner is not always honest with me     
Partner always keeps promises .869    
Believe information provided by preferred partner .887  .808  
     
Eigenvalue 2.14 1.34 1.50 1.39 
Percent variance 42.7 26.9 37.5 34.9 
Cumulative variance 42.7 69.6 37.5 72.4 
Cronbach's alpha 0.777 0.487 0.614 0.559 
 
For the Indonesian potato farmers, neither of the two factors extracted were acceptable as both 




Trust is more important in facilitating exchange in developing countries (Lyon 2000). Since 
small farmers have limited access to legal recourse, they must rely to a much greater extent on 
trust as the principal mechanism of market governance. Trust will operate when growers have 
confidence that their trading partners will not act opportunistically. Trust will come from the 
generalised norms of morality (reciprocity), the various sources of information the grower 
uses to evaluate a potential partner’s reputation and various social sanctions which include the 
loss of benefits, damage to reputations and social pressure from the community.    
 
While Lyon (2000) suggests that the most commonly cited reason for trusting someone is the 
result of a long-standing personal relationship, none of the measures used by Doney and 
Cannon (1997) included this personal aspect of trust. Primarily this is because they found it 
necessary to evaluate trust in an organisation and trust in an individual separately. However, 
in the context of small family farms, trust in an organisation and trust in an individual will be 
one and the same. For small family enterprises, participants expose not only the business, but 
also themselves and their immediate family to potential loss. Family firms are therefore more 
likely to consider trust as an important prerequisite in building long-term relationships and 
will actively seek, through the words and actions of other people (and organisations), those 
partners who they perceive as being most trustworthy. File, Mack and Prince (1994) describe 
family businesses as being more suspicious of unfamiliar exchange partners and to exert more 
effort in pre-purchase search and qualifying behaviors before undertaking new transactions. 
 
Lyon (2000) believes that it is necessary to understand how markets operate in different 
countries and to be sensitive to local path dependencies, rather than assume there are universal 
market forces or conditions that can be transplanted everywhere. Similarly, Moore (1999) 
suggests that it is dangerous to conflate trust over a wide range of social domains and to 
assume that one is describing an equivalent phenomenon in all contexts. Trust is not a generic 
phenomena nor is it similar in all social domains. The concept of trust is both emotive and of 
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